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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Any one of the five following bases is independently
sufficient to mandate reversal of the summary judgment entered by
the trial court:
1.

Reversal is mandated since Daniel Farris (Farris)

failed to carry his burden as the moving party described in the
case of Walker Drug Co., Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co. , 902 P.2d 1229
(Utah 1995).

This burden was not eliminated by reason of

McNair's response.
2.

Reversal is mandated since Leslie Scot McNair

(McNair) could rely on his pleadings in accordance with Gadd
v^ Olson, 685 P.2d 1041 (Utah 1984).
3.

Reversal is mandated since McNair's deposition

showed there existed a genuine issue of material fact.
4.

Reversal is mandated since McNair had until trial to

present expert testimony, no pretrial or discovery order having
been entered or violated.
5.

Reversal is mandated since the dismissal should not

have been with prejudice.
The first of these bases is addressed in connection with
Farris's burden.

The middle three bases are addressed in

connection with McNair's response to the motion.
addressed lastly and separately.

The last is

2

ARGUMENT
1.

JN MOVING FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, FARRIS DID NOT

CARRY, NOR WAS HE EXCUSED FROM CARRYING, HIS BURDEN OF PRESENTING
EVIDENCE THAT THERE WAS NO GENUINE ISSUE REGARDING THE NO-FAULT
THRESHOLD.
In Farris f s Brief, he does not dispute the following two
points made by McNair in his brief:

(1) Farris did not supply an

affidavit showing that there was no permanent disability or
permanent impairment based upon objective findings; and (2)
Farris's initial burden as the moving party was no less at a
pretrial held shortly before trial than at any other time.
Rather, Farris argues only that his burden as the moving
party was met when he "pointed out" to the court that McNair had
established no evidence to show such permanent disability or
impairment.

Brief of Appellee (Farris Brief) at 7-8.

Federal cases would require Farris to do more than "point out" an
absence of evidence adduced,
Farris cites Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106
S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) as supporting his position that
he did enough when he "pointed out" to the court that McNair had
not produced evidence of permanent disability.

In particular, he

cites language of that case holding that Rule 56 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure does not require the moving party to
support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials
negating the opponents claims.

Farris Brief at 7.

However, it is well to look at what the moving party did

3
in the Celotex case.

The case involved a wrongful death claim

against a manufacturer of asbestos products.
had pursued discovery.

The manufacturer

In answer to interrogatories, the

claimant had not been able to identify any witness or any other
potential source of competent evidence to show that the decedent
had ever been exposed to manufacturer's asbestos products.

The

manufacturer moved for summary judgment on this basis.
What more could the manufacturer have done in
preparation for the motion?
for it to depose.

There were no witnesses identified

In factf had witnesses been identified, the

manufacturer would clearly have had to do more:
Petitioner Celotex does not dispute that
if respondent has named a witness to supoort
her claim, summary judgment should not be
granted without Celotex somehow showing that
the named witness1 possible testimony raises no
genuine issue of material fact. I_d. 477
U.S. at 328, 106 S.Ct. at 2555 (White, J.,
concurring).
In the instant matter, Farris had no such difficulties
in preparing for his motion.
witness.

McNair himself was obviously a

He had been deposed, but Farris did not even refer to

the deposition, let alone quote parts pertinent to the motion.
Furthermore, Farris did not have to wait to see what
witnesses McNair might identify.

He could have had McNair submit

to a medical examination under Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure (URCP).
Finally, McNair had given Farris records identifying
doctors who had already attended to him.
163.

Record at (R.) 78, 157,

No reference to these doctors nor to their ooinions was
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made in Farris's motion, because no effort had been made to
contact them or find out their opinions.
Farris points out that there was over one year of
discovery.

Farris Brief at 4.

Thus Farris had over one year to

gather information in order to carry his burden as the moving
party.

Nevertheless, he did not do so.

He should have waited

until trial, when McNair would have had the burden of proof.
The Celotex Court pointed out that language from the
case of Adickes v. S.H. Kress St Co. , 398 U.S. 144, 159, 90 S.Ct.
1598, 1609, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) should not have been construed
to require such a heavy burden on the moving party.

However, the

Celotex opinion agreed that the facts of that case showed the
moving party had not carried its burden.

Celotex, supra, 477

U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554.
Adickes involved a civil rights action where it was part
of the prima facie case to show that some action was taken "under
color of law."

Adickes, supra, 398 U.S. at 150, 90 S.Ct. 1604.

This element could be established by showing the presence of a
policeman in the store.

The Court ruled that the moving party

"failed to fulfill its initial burden of demonstrating what is a
critical element in this aspect of the case - that there was no
policeman in the store."

Id., 398 U.S. at 158, 90 S.Ct. at 1609.

Since this burden had not been fulfilled, there was never any
requirement for the other party to come forward with an affidavit
properly asserting the presence of a policeman in the store.
Id., 398 U.S. at 159, 90 S.Ct. at 1609.
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Just as the Celotex opinion served to stop the language
of the Adickes opinion from being construed too broadly, Justice
White's concurring opinion serves to keep the language of the
main Celotex opinion from being construed too broadly.

He did so

by stating:
It is not enough to move for summary judgment
without supporting the motion in any way or
with a conciusory assertion that the plaintiff
has no evidence to prove his case. Celotex,
supra, 477 U.S. at 328, 106 S.Ct. at 2555
(White, J., concurring).
Farris berates McNair's reference to this concurring
opinion on the basis pf its being nonbinding.^

However, when the

Court is divided five to four, as in the Celotex case, the
concurring opinion is very persuasive.

It shows that it would

have been decided the other way had the defendant moved "for
summary judgment without supporting the motion in any way or with
a conciusory assertion that the plaintiff has no evidence to
prove his case. "
Thus the construction Farris gives the majority opinion
i n Celotex is too broad, as we can see from the concurring
opinion.
Furthermore, as stated in the case of Harline v. Barker,
912 P.2d 433 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court was not bound by
Celotex, and specifically declined to adopt the reasoning of the
majority opinion in that case.
1

On the other hand, it is interesting to note that
Farris quotes from the syllabus. Farris Brief at 6-7. The
syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court. See
footnote Celotex, supra, 106 S.Ct. at 2549.

6
The governing Utah case law clearly reguires Farris to do more as
the moving party than he did.
The cases which do govern the interpretation of Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure as they pertain to summary judgment have
been decided by Utah Supreme Court and have been extensively set
forth in McNair's opening brief.
For example, in the case of Walker Drug Co., Inc. v. La
Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1995), the Walkers had the
burden at trial to prove that damage occurred within the
limitations period.

However, they had no such burden in response

to a motion for summary judgment, where the moving party had not
produced an affidavit showing that no damage had occurred within
that period.
The only time a moving party does not have to carry its
initial burden is when the responding party provides evidence
showing that it cannot sustain its burden at trial.

This

occurred in the fact situation described in the case of Harline
v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433 (Utah 1996).

Even though the nonmoving

party had no duty to provide evidence, the court was not reguired
to ignore the fact that the evidence voluntarily provided proved
the party could not succeed at trial.
As shown below, the evidence provided by McNair showed
he had a good chance of success at trial, rather than precluding
the possibility of that success.

7
2.

THERE WERE THREE INDEPENDENTLY SUFFICIENT WAYS THAT

McNAIR RAISED A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT REGARDING
PERMANENT DISABILITY,
McNair could rely on his pleadings.
McNair alleged in his Complaint that "plaintiff was
caused to and continues to suffer from, ... (c)
disability."

Permanent

R. 2.

Farris claims that this allegation in McNair's pleading
was insufficient to raise an issue of fact, and thus summary
judgment was proper.

The basis for this claim is McNair's

failure to follow the ruling in Celotex and comply with the
requirement of Rule 56(e) URCP for the nonmoving party to go
beyond the pleadings.

Farris Brief at 8.

It is true that the moving party in Celotex had not
supplied affidavits, and it is true the nonmoving party could not
rely just on the pleadings.

However, that moving party was

relying on much more than pleadings.

As explained above, that

party also relied on one or more "depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file," in addition to
pleadings.
Also as indicated above, whether Celotex and cases
decided by the Utah Supreme Court can be reconciled or not is
irrelevant.

The Utah cases govern.

That is why the Utah Court

of Appeals referred the case of State v. Crosby, 302 Utah Adv.
Rep. 36 (Utah 1996) to the Utah Supreme Court.

The Court of

Appeals was bound by a decision of the Utah Supreme Court
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construing a rule of evidence, not by a later decision by the
United States Supreme Court construing differently a comparable
federal rule.
In the case of Gadd v± 01sonf 685 P.2d 1041 (Utah 1984) f
the moving party essentially relied solely on the oleadings.
fact, the motion was for dismissal on the pleadings.

In

That party

argued that once its answer was filed, negating the affirmative
allegations of the other party, the nonmoving party could no
longer rely solely on pleadings.

The Utah Supreme Court figured

that such an argument must have been based on an interpretation
of Rule 56(e) URCP.

Id. at 1045.

However, the Supreme Court found Rule 56(e), properly
construed, would be inapplicable where the moving party did not
choose to support the motion with affidavits.
When read in light of section (b) of Rule 56,
which provides that the party moving for
summary judgment may do so "with or without
supporting affidavits," it is clear that the
section (e) requirement that a party opposing
the summary judgment motion file counteraffidavits applies only when the moving party
has elected to and has filed affidavits in
support of the motion. If, as in this case,
the moving party chooses not to or simply fails
to file affidavits, section (e) is
inapplicable. Id.
Thus, since Farris did not support his motion with an
affidavit averring that McNair did not have a permanent
disability, McNair 1 s pleading that he did have a permanent
disability was sufficient to raise or maintain that issue of
fact.
Farris cites the case of Dybowski v. Hahn, 775 P.2d 445
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(Utah App. 1989) in support of his position that moving without
affidavits would not in any way reduce McNair's burden in
responding.

Farris Brief at 9.

However, the Dybowski opinion

does not state whether affidavits were supplied in support of the
motion.

Additionally, the moving party relied on depositions

which clearly showed the nonmoving party could not carry her
burden at trial.
On the other hand, Farris conspicuously left out
McNair's testimony given in deposition concerning the extent and
permanency of his disability.

In addition to the pleadings,

Farris relied solely on a conclusory statement that McNair did
not suffer a "serious impairment of bodily function" (R. 66), a
phrase derived from New York's statute, not Utah's.

Compare New

York Insurance Law, Section 5102(d) ("significant limitation of
use of a body function or system") and Utah Code Section 31A-22309(1) (c) ("permanent disability").
And of course, Farris did not mention in his motion, and
urged the trial court to disregard, the possibility that McNair
would have additional testimony at trial as to his permanent
disability.

R. 162.

McHair produced sufficient evidence of permanent disability.
Farris claims that the following testimony in McNair's
deposition is insufficient evidence of permanent disability:
0. At the present time, Lee, do you have —
what problems are you having with your foot?
A. Extreme soreness. I have a problem with
balance. The foot is weaker now. My leg is weaker,
now, in fact, from being casted. I suppose that will
come back. It is still very, very sore. It was
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crushed and it was crushed slowly. The tire was
turning and grinding on it. It is taking a lot longer
to heal. It is not one simple injury, you know. Had I
tripped and snapped a bone, you know, perhaps it would
be simpler.
R. 123. 2

Farris Brief at 11.
Farris discounts this testimony on the basis that a jury

cannot find the existence of permanent disability in the absence
of expert medical testimony.
Farris first supports this position by citing three
cases, Henley v. Rodeway Express, 699 S.W.2d 150 (Tenn. 1985),
Employer1s Ins. Co. of Alabama v. Heath, 536 S.W.2d 341 (Tenn.
1976), and Zoldas v. Louise Cab Corp., 489 N.Y.S.2d 468 (A.D.I
Dept. 19 85).
Two of these cases, Henley and Employer's Ins. Co.,
address the issue of permanent disability as it pertains to
worker's compensation.

It is not surprising that the law would

be more stringent where the permanent disability itself justifies
an award.

This is in contrast with the instant matter, where a

finding of permanent disability serves only to permit the
presentation of evidence in support of an appropriate award.
Had the legislature meant for a finding of permanent
disability to require the same proof in the context of no-fault
automobile insurance law, it had a pattern to follow in the form
of the law pertaining to worker's compensation.

2

The legislature

As indicated in Beltran v. Allan, 302 Utah Adv. Rep.
23, 26 n.l (Utah App. 1996), excerots of a deposition presented
to the court in memoranda are part of the record, regardless of
whether the deposition was admitted or published.
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did not choose to follow that pattern.
Even in the context of worker's compensation, expert
opinion is not required to show the extent of the disability.
Employer1s Ins. Co., supra.
In the third case, the Zoldas case, the moving parties
fully supported their motion, marshalling all evidence showing
the seriousness of the injury, and supplying the affidavit of
their neurologist finding no abnormalities.

Furthermore, that

case bolsters its conclusion by specifically referring to the
word "significant," which appears in New York's law, but not in
Utah's.

New York Insurance Law, Section 5102(d), Utah Code

Section 31A-22-309(1)(c).
However, even under New York law, the threshold of a
"serious injury" may be proved at trial without expert testimony.
An example of this is found in the case of D1Avolio v.
Dictaphone Corp., 822 F.2d 5 (2nd Cir. 1987).
expert testimony was used.

In that case, no

Rather, the plaintiffs used medical

records and their own testimony.

This sufficed to show the

existence of a "serious injury" under New York law since the
evidence proved there was a medically determined injury which
substantially prevented performance of customary daily
activities.
Farris relies heavily on the case of Marino v. Rosen,
561 N.Y.S.2d 280 (A.D.2 Dept. 1990).

Farris Brief at 12.

case also turned on whether there was a "serious injury."
282.

That
Id_. at

The "speculative" medical testimony had to do with whether
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there had ever been a bone fracture in his leg.

Furthermore, the

injured oarty testified that he was fully engaged in a number of
sports activities.
In contrast, Farris has clearly broken more than one of
McNair 1 s bones.

There is no testimony that McNair has ever again

been able to use his foot as before.

To the contrary, McNair1s

testimony is not only that his foot is extremely sore, but that
it is weaker and causes him a problem with balance.

R. 123.

Finally, unlike in the Marino case, McNair has never had a chance
to put on evidence at trial.
Farris states that the criteria applicable to his motion
are the same as those applicable to a motion for a directed
verdict, citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

Farris Brief at 5.

This

may well be true, once the moving party has met its initial
burden, a matter which was assumed and was therefore not an issue
in Anderson.

Id., 477 U.S. at 250 n.4, 106 S.Ct. at 2511 n.4.

As stated in Anderson, "If reasonable minds could differ
as to the import of the evidence, however, a verdict should not
be directed."

^d., 477 U.S. at 250-251, 106 S.Ct. at 2511.

This same criterion was accepted in the case of Parker
v. Nakaoka, 722 P.2d 1028 (Hawaii 1986):
We hold that whether Appellee met the threshold
requirement is for the jury to determine
inasmuch as the facts relating to Appellee's
injury are in dispute and reasonable minds
could differ on whether Appellee sustained an
injury which consists, in whole or in part, in
a significant permanent loss of use of a part
or function of her body. ^d. 722 P.2d at 1031.
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The Utah Supreme Court discussed criteria for a directed
verdict in the case of DeBry v. Cascade Enterprises, 879 P.2d
1353, 1359 (Utah 1994):
A directed verdict and a judgment n.o.v.
are justified only if, after looking at the
evidence and all reasonable inferences in a
light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
"the trial court concludes that there is no
competent evidence which would support a
verdict in his favor." [Citations.] A motion
should be denied HI[i]f reasonable persons
could reach differing conclusions on the issue
in controversy.'"
McNair stated that his foot was weaker and extremely
sore, and that it was causing him a problem with balance.

All of

the reasonable favorable inferences that could be drawn from that
statement had to be considered.

Certainly a reasonable person

hearing this testimony one year after the injury might conclude
that McNair was suffering from a permanent disability.
Anticipated expert testimony at trial could not be precluded.
On pages 12 and 13 of his brief, Farris sets forth two
bases for his assertion that McNair was wrong in claiming he had
until the time of trial, rather than just until the time of
pretrial, to prove compliance with the no-fault threshold.
First, McNair1s counsel twice filed a certification of
readiness for trial.
Second, McNair did not supply additional evidence when
moving for a new trial, although the vacated trial date had
passed.
Farris supports neither of these bases with case law,
nor by reference to any applicable rule.
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There is no rule or case law requiring that a party come
forward with evidence before trial because that party filed a
certification of readiness for trial.

Although a partv may feel

that it is ready for trial, and certifies as much, it is
certainly not out of the ordinary for that party to continue its
preparation.

In the course of that preoaration it is also not

uncommon for a oarty to realize that additional evidence must be
gathered for presentation at trial.
Only a properly supported motion for summary judgment
requires the opposing party to supply, before trial, affidavits
of witnesses oertaining to the issues adeauately addressed in the
motion.

Such affidavits are not required at pretrial merely

because the oarty opposing the motion has certified its readiness
for trial.
Naturally, if it is clear at pretrial that the necessary
evidence cannot be gathered for trial, a summary disposition of
some sort probably will be approoriate.
However, such was not the factual scenario in the
instant matter.

McNair's plan was to work to obtain additional

pertinent evidence that very day following pretrial.

R. 157,

162.
As to Farris's second reason regarding the passage of
the date originally set for trial, a trial date is irrelevant if
the trial is stricken.
evidence at trial.

McNair has never been permitted to put on

McNair cannot be required to supply

affidavits of witnesses pertaining to all issues on which he
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bears the burden of proof merely because it is after the date on
which the trial had originally been set.
It may be true that a motion for a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence would require support in the form of
affidavits setting forth that additional evidence.

However, a

motion for a new trial based on an error of law would need no
more evidentiary support than that which was before the court
when the original ruling was made.
Thus neither McNair's certifications of readiness for
trial nor the passage of the date on which the trial had
originally been set would justify precluding McNair's expert
witnesses from testifying at trial.

As indicated in the cases of

Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980) and Berrett v. Denver
and Rio Grande W. R., 830 P.2d 291 (Utah Apo. 1992), cert,
denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992), a trial court generally only
may exclude the testimony of an expert witness if the party
seeking to call that witness has violated a court order.
As stated in the case of Pifcho v. Brewer, 77 F.R.D. 356
(M.D. Pa. 1977), pretrial may not be a substitute for trial.
Only if there clearly will be no material issues of fact to be
resolved at trial may judgment be ordered beforehand.
In the instant matter, not only was McNair planning to
testify at trial, but every effort was being made to have expert
witnesses present at trial, which witnesses were expected to
testify regarding the fact of oermanent disability as set forth
in McNair's complaint.

Thus the result of that trial, and
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particularly the finding of a reasonable jury on that issue, was
in no way predetermined.
3.

A DISMISSAL AT PRETRIAL FOR FAILURE TO MEET THE

THRESHOLD REQUIREMENTS SHOULD NOT BE WITH PREJUDICE.
Farris cites the case of Jepson v. State Dept. of
Corrections, 846 P.2d 485 (Utah App. 1993) and claims it supports
his position that the dismissal of McNair1s cause of action was
appropriately with prejudice.

Farris's rationale is that the

Jepson case stands for the proposition that the time for proving
a case should not be extended.

Farris Brief at 14.

It is true the Jepson case did not allow a claimant to
wait to file an action until the no-fault threshold had been
reached, regardless of the expiration of the limitations period
as measured from the time the injury occurred.

But the opinion

acknowledged that the claimant would have more time after filing
to reach the threshold, namely, until the trial.

As indicated

above, McNair was precluded from going to trial, that is, trial
was never held.
Furthermore, even if McNair had no chance of showing
compliance with the no-fault threshold at trial, and dismissal
was justified, a dismissal without prejudice would only extend
the time for filing another year or until the end of the original
limitations period.

This would not "introduce considerable

uncertainty into the law, as well as unduly prolonged controversy
over many cases."

Farris Brief at 14.

As indicated, the Jepson case, part of which that quote
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paraphrased, dealt with allowing an injured party to wait until
the threshold requirements were met before filing an action.
Clearly that could take an indeterminate number of years.

That

would indeed be "introducing considerable uncertainty into the
law as well as unduly prolonging controversy over such cases."
Jepson, supra , 846 P.2d at 488, quoting Carter v. Cross, 373
So.2d 81, 83 (Fla. App. 1979), cert, denied, 385 So.2d 755 (Fla.
1980).
Since it would not lead to the horrors described by
Farris, any pretrial dismissal for failure to meet the no-fault
threshold should be without prejudice, especially where it
appears that the threshold may be met before the expiration of
the appropriate limitation period.
This would comport with the general rule that courts
favor deciding cases upon the merits.
Dismissal with prejudice ... is a harsh
and permanent remedy when it precludes a
presentation of a plaintiff's claims on their
merits. Our rules of procedure are intended to
encourage the adjudication of disputes on their
merits . Bonneville Tower v. Thompson Michie
Assoc., 728 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1986).
CONCLUSION
Although each of the five following bases is sufficient
to mandate reversal of the summary judgment, all of them apply to
this case:
1.

Farris failed to carry his burden as the moving

party in his motion for summary judgment.

This burden was not

met by McNair's response and thus the motion could not be
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granted.
2.

Since Farris chose not to rely upon affidavits, and

in fact did not rely upon anything other than pleadings and
conclusory statements, McNair1s pleadings were sufficient to
preclude summary judgment.
3.

McNair's deposition showed there existed a genuine

issue of material fact regarding permanent disability.
4.

Since no pretrial or discovery order was entered or

violated, McNair had until trial to present the expert testimony
he anticipated.
5.

Dismissal should not have been with prejudice since

the merits were not reached.
Therefore, for each and all of the foregoing reasons,
this Court should reverse the Order Granting Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, it should reverse
the Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial.
should then be remanded for trial.

The case

In the alternative, the

dismissal should be ruled to be without prejudice.
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
McNair does not object to Farrfs'p rrgaest for oral
argument, and in fact, joins in respectfully requesting that oral
argument be had in this case.
DATED this

Z j ~~ day of

//^^J*~~

, 1996.

LYNN F.HEWARD
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant
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